Der Cyberraum als künftiger Kriegsschauplatz. ANALYSE der chinesischen Anstrengungen von ELSA KANIA

Deutsche Zusammenfassung
China erhebt die Cybersicherheit zu einem integralen Bestandteil der Staatssicherheit. Damit wird einerseits die „Informationsdominanz“ im (chinesischen) Internet verstanden, aber auch die Verteidigung und Eroberung von Informationsdominanz durch militärische Cyber-Streitkräfte als Teil der „aktiven Verteidigung“. In diesem Bereich ist mit dem Aufbau des Cyberspace Security Military-Civil Fusion Innovation Centre auch eine verstärkte Verschränkung militärischer und ziviler Zusammenarbeit merkbar. Eine Analyse von Elsa Kania, publiziert im Strategist des ASPI, des Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

China’s quest for political control and military supremacy in the cyber domain

by Elsa Kania

 

The People’s Republic of China seeks to contest information dominance (制信息权) and discursive dominance (话语权) in cyberspace. For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), cybersecurity is integral to comprehensive state security (国家安全). That’s distinct from ‘national’ security in that it focuses on preserving stability and legitimacy to ensure the regime’s survival. Xi Jinping has said that ‘without cybersecurity, there is no state security’.

In this concept of cybersecurity, information security and control take priority. Indeed, for the CCP, threats to cyber sovereignty (网络主权) are seen as existential in nature. For that reason, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is actively building its capabilities to engage in ‘military struggle’ (军事斗争) in the cyber domain.

The CCP has long believed itself to be engaged in an ideological contest in cyberspace. It has sought to counter foreign ‘hostile forces’ (敌对势力) through censorship and propaganda. It blames those influences for popular protests that have overthrown authoritarian governments, as in the Arab Spring.

Tellingly, a research centre with the Cyberspace Administration of China has written, ‘If our party cannot traverse the hurdle represented by the internet, it cannot traverse the hurdle of remaining in power for the long term.’

So far, China has defied initial, utopian expectations for the future of the internet. Instead, the CCP has sought to reshape and harness the internet as a tool to enhance its social control, while still allowing a vibrant digital economy to thrive within certain parameters.

Xi Jinping articulated the objective for China to become a ‘cyber superpower’ (网络强国), to be not only the world’s largest nation in cyberspace, but also the most powerful. His own consolidation of power has included gaining absolute control over the PLA, in line with Mao’s maxim that the ‘Party commands the gun’.

China’s 2015 national defence white paper on military strategy—which included the PLA’s commitment ‘to remain a staunch force for upholding the CCP’s ruling position’ and to preserve ‘social stability’—also called for the PLA to ‘expedite the development of a cyber force’ and to enhance its capabilities in ‘cyberspace situation awareness’ and cyber defence. The stated objectives of these forces are ‘to stem major cyber crises, ensure national network and information security, and maintain national security and social stability’.

At a basic level, the PLA’s approach to employing military cyber forces should be understood as another piece in China’s strategy of ‘active defence’ (积极防御). In essence, that means, ‘We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counter-attack if attacked.’

When applied to the cyber domain, this logic implies that offensive operations at the tactical and operational levels would be consistent with a defensive orientation at the strategic level. ….